Agent based Iterated Multiple Lake Game with Local Governments Tomohisa Yamashita, Keiji Suzuki, Azuma Ohuchi
Abstract
	In this paper, we extend the environment management game, ``The Lake", ККto the agent based Кiterated game. In the original game, the factories as players can make coalitions to save the cost for water purification. Although the whole coalition Кformation is a desirable solution in the original game, Кthe rational Кfactories fail to make whole coalitions and some of them become free loaders. To discuss more realistic situations and dynamic coalition formative processes, we introduce a new game model based on multiple lakes with local governments Кas new players. The local governments will affect the factories by levying taxes and imposing penalties. Although the objective of the local governments to maximize revenues, the competition between local governments cause dilemmas to restrain their selfish behaviors. Therefore, the governments have to adjust the tax and penalty adaptively according to the number of factories at their lakes. Under the adjustments of tax and penalties, the factories will be expected to make coalitions. In the experimental results, the evolutionary Кacquired strategies of these players are shown to produce the complex coalition formation processes in iterated games. Especially, we compared the single lake model and the multiple lake model to discuss the effects of the government dilemmas.

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